Italy adopted the European Union Directives for the liberalisation of electricity and natural gas markets by means of two legislative decrees issued in February 1999 (electricity) and May 2000 (natural gas). Consequently, the Italian electricity monopolist Enel was obliged to sell 15,000 megawatts of its installed capacity to other operators, in order to promote competition in power generation. At the same time it was established the creation of an electricity pool that will concentrate short-term physical exchanges. In such a market, the gross operating margin -the so called Spark Spread -plays a crucial role, being the most important price signal and value driver for power generators.
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This paper is mainly focused on studying past and future values of the Spark Spread in Italy, showing how power generation assets can be evaluated using a Spark Spread option model.
In the first paragraph we focus on the analysis of the Ct index, a sort of variable cost so far recognized to Italian electricity producers.
In the second paragraph we discuss about the future organization of the electricity pool and present the principal features of existing market models which aim at replicating this system.
In the third paragraph we illustrate the main features of an option-based simulation model, which allows to capture price volatility and option value of power generation assets, by using the Spark Spread concept and the theory of real options.
In the last paragraph we present an application of the model to the evaluation of a merchant power plant in the Italian deregulated market and compare the results with those obtained using the traditional discounted cash flow methodology (DCF).
The Historical Spark Spread and the Ct Index
In the Italian electricity system, the fuel costs incurred by domestic thermoelectric power producers -mainly monopolist Enel -are fully reimbursed to them. Indeed, tariffs charged to final customers include the so called Ct component, which is passed-through to thermoelectric producers. This fuel cost recovery system was set in place in 1997 by the Italian Energy Regulation Authority -Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gas (AEEG). The Ct construction took into account the Italian expected electricity consumption for 1997, closely replicating the Italian fuel mix of 1996. The Ct index is given by the following expression:
In the previous formula PCOAL depends on the prices of six types of coal imported in Italy, POIL is a 80%-20% mix of 1% LSFO NWE and 0,3% VLSFO NY, PGAS is a 50%-50% of 1% LSFO NWE and four break-even crude prices. For each two-months period an average of fuel prices is calculated, taking the last four months prices with a time lag of one month. All prices include an average transportation cost to the plant gate. Taking into account fuels calorific values and the Euro/USD exchange rate, the three indexes are then expressed in Euro/Mcal. Finally, the Ct value is obtained by multiplying by Vt, which is the reference system heat rate 1 equal to 2.26 Mcal/kWh, corresponding to an energy conversion efficiency of about 38%.
In order to better understand the nature and the effects of this fuel cost recovery system, we introduce here the concept of Ct Spark Spread (CtSS), which is given by the Ct less the product of the heat rate H and the fuel price S F , ( )
When the AEEG introduced the Ct index their objective was to guarantee the full recovery of the fuel costs incurred by the Italian system as a whole. Consequently, just by construction, the CtSS in (2) should be always equal to zero at national level. Thus, any producer with the same fuel basket and heat rate as the Ct index should precisely break-even. And since the Italian generation set and fuel basket mainly coincided with the Enel ones, the monopolist was allowed to almost entirely recover its fuel costs.
On the other side, however, it may happen that some producers do not wholly recover their fuel costs, while some others may earn a profit thanks to this rule. This is clearly shown in the Fig. 1 , where the Ct Spark Spread is plotted over the past four years. Simply looking at the graph, we can get useful information on how the Ct system has worked so far. The Ct index includes two highly correlated indexes, POIL and PGAS, and a third one, PCOAL, which is essentially uncorrelated with the other two. The evident result is that the three indexes either move all together, at different speeds, towards the zero-line Spark Spread, or they diverge all together. For example, it is clear that the severe increase in oil prices in 1999 influenced, with a few months lag, the Ct, which in turn increased. As coal price continued to decrease, the result was a worsening of oil and gas CtSS, while production by coal has been securing a huge Ct Spark Spread.
In other words, considering the single sources of electricity generation, it can be easily observed that coal production has always got a positive gross operation margin, fuel oil has been near to break-even fuel costs, while plants fuelled with natural gas always generated a negative gross production margin. Basically, this is due to the weighted average feature of the Ct index. As previously said, the cost position of each producer/plant could be different with respect to the average national picture. For instance, should a producer/plant use only LSFO, its Spark Spread would be more favourable, because the POIL includes about 20% of high-price VLSFO. This is also the case, to a higher extent, of cheap HSFO and Orimulsion 2 . Concerning natural gas 3 , instead, despite small margin improvements may be achieved by power plants with heat rates lower than the system average -i.e. Rt in (1), power production at the Ct implied heat rate has never fully recovered fuel costs.
Nonetheless, the Ct Spark Spread constitutes a price signal both in the short and the long run. In the short run, the CtSS figure clearly shows when a plant, if operated, will cover or not its fuel costs. In the long run, the CtSS signal contributed to move the Italian generation set towards higher efficiency rates -i.e. Combined Cycle Gas Turbines, CCGTand cheaper fuels, notably Orimulsion. Anyway it is worth noting that the price signal was not so strong as it should have been. In fact, the system remunerated fixed costs with a capacity payment that reached 116 Euro/MWh in peak hours until year 2000.
Despite the launch of the liberalization process, the Ct electricity indexation still remains pervasive. In this respect, new traders and wholesalers who have entered the Italian market, positioning themselves among producers and final customers, had to index their purchases and sales to the Ct index, thus finding themselves exposed to it, even when they did not own or operate any MW of capacity.
However, it seems that the Ct index has some drawbacks. First of all, the basket no longer represents the actual Italian fuel mix, due to an increase in natural gas weight. The consumption of fuel in 1999 was coal (12.2%), oil refined products (49.1%, including Orimulsion and others), natural gas (38.7%) 4 . Some calculations for May-June 2001 have shown that, if simply the new percentages replaced the old ones, the new Ct index should be at least 2 Euro/MWh higher. This should be mitigated a little by taking into account the cheaper Orimulsion fuel and the increasing presence of high efficiency CCGTs.
Moreover, the Ct index covers a range of crude oils and refined products whose market transactions are not sufficiently liquid. It is the case of No.6 0.3% LoPr Fuel Oil (VLSFO) traded at New York harbour, the four crudes and seven coals in the Ct index formula. Their extremely low liquidity implies that exposure to Ct is not fully hedgeable in the financial market, thus leaving producers and traders exposed to a basis risk, which turns into extra costs for the system.
The Ct should arrive to natural death when the electricity pool will be in place. Indeed, it is clear that the system should recover fuel generating costs in the marketplace and no longer through a Ct-based cost recovery structure. However, the launch of the pool is having a big delay, and now it is scheduled for the summer of 2002. Should the time remaining to the launch of the electricity pool be so long, the AEEG should address a review of the Ct index, by updating the fuel basket in order to reflect more closely the current generation fuel mix. The inclusion of more liquid products should be considered as well, in order to ease the reasonable efforts of producers and traders to hedge the Ct in the financial commodity market.
Modelling the future Italian Electricity Pool
One of the most important point in the liberalisation of Italian electricity market was the creation of the electricity pool where physical supply and demand will meet. It is a system where generators bid on a daily basis to produce during the next day. The Independent Market Operator orders these offers, starting from the one with the lowest price, until reaching the demand which is forecasted for each hour of the next day; by doing so, an "economic merit order" is put in place. The price 5 bidden by the last generator allowed to produce is the so called "System Marginal Price" (SMP). Each generator will be called into production if and only if the bidden price is not greater than the SMP. All generators called to produce at the same time will receive the relevant SMP, thus making a profit with respect to their offer.
Since in a truly competitive market each operator bids exactly its production marginal cost 6 -i.e. mainly the fuel cost -, we can state that, if the generator is allowed to produce, then the Spark Spread associated to its specific heat rate must be certainly non negative
From (3) it is clear that forecasting the SMP represents a key issue which should be addressed by any operator who decides to enter the Italian electricity market. So far, models used to make such forecasts aim at replicating the functioning of the electricity pool. They rely on a built-in database of the Italian generation set, in which power plants are differentiated mainly on the basis of their different fuel costs at the plant gate and heat rates. As far as demand side is concerned, some typical patterns of daily consumption are put into the model, considering business and non business days, peak and off-peak hours. Then, for each hour in each pattern, the merit order is built, determining which plants are called into production. Consequently, if a plant is allowed to produce for n hours in just a single pattern and that pattern accounts for d days per year, then that plant will produce for n⋅d hours per year.
These market models are essentially static. When a plant is called into production for some hours in one pattern of consumption, it means that it will produce in all homologue hours in that pattern. Each year, the SMP in each hour of each pattern is fixed and, as a consequence, a system load curve is created. Over future years, as forecasted demand increases, new and more efficient power plants are put into the model, and this way the electricity price should, ceteris paribus, reduce in the long run. 5 All price bids are expressed in Euro/kWh and are also associated to the quantity the generator is willing to produce. 6 See Appendix for a proof of this statement.
It appears clear that, while these market models try to replicate the way the pool will work, they miss the most important feature of electricity: price volatility. As a matter of fact, it is well known that electricity has the most volatile price among commodities, well beyond oil or natural gas prices. Not forecasted factors both in the supply and demand side, such as plant outages or severe departures from typical levels of demand, in a market in which the good must be produced in the very moment at which it is demanded and consumed, bring to those extreme price spikes observed in deregulated electricity markets all over the world 7 .
In our view, the future Italian electricity system will share this important feature, but with the peculiarity that the country mainly relies on foreign fuels supply. The Spark Spread will be determined by the interaction of electricity and fuels prices. In the next years, the electricity market will be a national one, since interconnection capacity with other countries is limited and electricity prices will be determined on the basis of domestic supply and demand. On the other side, fuel prices are determined in the international marketplace and will continue to show lower volatility and very low correlation with respect to Italian electricity prices 8 . The expected volatile Italian electricity price will not be capable to drag fuel prices and this will imply a highly volatile Spark Spread.
Therefore, we must conclude that ignoring volatility when calculating electricity prices means that an essential source of revenues for generators is missed. To be in the market in particular moments can bring them high or even huge profits. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to study the effect of volatility on the value of Italian electricity assets.
The Spark Spread Option Model
In a deregulated electricity market, the Spark Spread plays a fundamental role, as it becomes the main indicator of convenience to produce. The generator will produce if and only if the Spark Spread is not negative, otherwise it will shut down the plant and either save the fuel cost or, if already owned, reselling it in the market. Adopting a formal point of view, the power producer is the holder of a call option on the gross generating margin. It is then worthwhile to give here the definition of European Spark Spread Call Option.
A European Spark Spread Call Option with maturity T is a contract giving the option holder the right, but not the obligation, to pay H times the unit price 
The (4) clearly expresses the difference between monopolistic and liberalized markets. In monopoly, Enel was compelled to produce in order to meet Italian electricity demand also when, for some plants, the Spark Spread in (2) was negative. In competitive markets, generators will operate their facilities only when this is profitable, that is when, as stated in (3), the gross generation margin is at least zero. This proves an enlightening example of just one real option arising in liberalised markets. Electricity market models rightly consider the Spark Spread in (3) as an important factor in determining the value of generation assets, but despite taking into account the option feature, they miss an important source of value that is price volatility.
The Spark Spread option has some peculiarities with respect to the simple plain-vanilla option studied by F. Black and M. Scholes 10 , sharing with it the sole European feature, that is it can be exercised only at expiry. The Spark Spread option is a basket option, being written on more than one asset. The basic concept is that the holder of such options is given the right, but not the obligation, to pay the fuel price H⋅ F T S and receive the electricity price. So this is an option to exchange fuel for electricity at a predetermined heat rate and at a certain time in the future 11 .
Taking a closer look at reality, the owner of a power plant holds a long strip of European Spark Spread call options with sequential maturities, rather than a single-shoot option. Each of these options gives the producer the right, but not the obligation, to operate its facility during each hour of each day over the life of the plant. As Black-Scholes and common sense teach us, the more volatile the electricity price, the more valuable the option and, as previously stated, the greater the value of the power plant. Static market models miss the whole volatility effect, thus underestimating the value of either old and new installed capacity.
In the light of what we have stated so far, we must conclude that the value of a generation asset can be expressed as
where C(.) is given by (4), t is the current time and T is the time evaluation horizon of the plant. In the following paragraph we illustrate how C(.) can be calculated and present an application of (5) to the future Italian electricity market.
An application to the Italian Electricity Market
In this paragraph we present the main results of the valuation of Italian electricity generation assets, performed by taking explicitly into account price volatility and the option feature of the Spark Spread. The evaluation was carried out for a hypothetical merchant plant, i.e. a plant which sells the bulk of its production in the electricity pool on a spot basis. Consequently, long terms contracts and any other form of price volatility reduction were assumed not to be in place.
The Structured Monte Carlo simulation approach was used to run calculations. The stochastic evolution of both electricity and fuel prices was modelled with a Geometric Brownian Motion fitted to forward price curves, while correlation between prices was taken into account by means of Cholesky factorisation.
The main reason that led us to choose the Monte Carlo simulation approach for evaluating Spark Spread Options is that existing closed-form solutions, such as Magrabe's, are not capable to take into account important factors, like mean reversion and forward prices. Moreover, they cannot deal with complex pricing formulas including arithmetic averages and time lags, which are widely used in energy markets. Basically, for each maturity date within the life of the plant, we simulated a high number of Spark Spread future scenarios and, assuming a risk-neutral world, we calculated the average discounted payoff according to the (4) . Recalling the (5), the sum of all average discounted payoffs represents the value of the power plant.
We simulated the Spark Spread for a steam boiler power plant burning LSFO. The price of fuel oil is CIF MED and forward prices are taken from the OTC market (Fig. 2) . Concerning electricity, since no forward curves can be found in the market yet, our basic idea was then to rely on some market forecasts about next fifteen years electricity prices. The forward curves are used to make simulated price scenarios consistent with forward data.
The valuation of the power plant was performed according to different values of the heat rate, volatility, correlation and mean reversion speed. The volatility effect proved to be the most important one. As it should be expected, as electricity price volatility increases, the value of generation assets increases 12 .
The choice of fitting the price path to forward curves allowed us to get a more fair value for the asset, as well as to make a comparison with the results obtained by applying the DCF method to the same forward curves. The results are plotted in Fig 3. Since we used the same hypothesis to perform calculations with the two methodologies, results may substantially be ascribed to the volatility effect and not be considered as dependent on the particular shape and values of the forward curves. The graph proves what we have anticipated previously. Static market models, such as the DCF method, lose that portion of asset value associated to volatility.
POWER PLANT VALUE vs HEAT RATE
The graph was made using different heat rate values, i.e. different conversion efficiencies. The difference between the two results widens when choosing a higher heat rate; at some point, where the DCF Spark Spread would become null, the real option method keeps showing positive values. This well describes the situation in which the plant, becoming older, loses efficiency and moves towards midload and peakload utilization. Only the real option evaluation can justify the plant operation even at low efficiency rates, while according to DCF valuation the plant should be simply shut down.
Conclusions and future extensions
In this paper we have presented a new methodology to evaluate electricity generation assets in the Italian liberalized market. We showed how electricity price volatility and optionality in operating the plants imply that a Spark Spread option model is suitable for the purpose. Our results prove that, simply relying on traditional discounted cash flows models, these may seriously underestimate the plant value and lead to inefficient levels of installed capacity in the long run.
The real option model needs to incorporate some further features of the future Italian electricity market. First of all, other fuels have to be considered, mainly natural gas and coal, and other types of plants should be simulated, e.g. open and combined cycle gas turbines. The stochastic process has to take into account jumps in prices, a commonly shared feature of electricity; this is a necessary requirement in order to study peakload periods. Finally, the long-waited launch of the pool and of a related financial market will allow to directly observe variables -e.g. price volatility and forward curves -we could only estimate to process simulations.
In our view, all these necessary extensions could help to obtain more reliable results from an operational point of view, but should not undermine the principal findings of this study.
Proof
The rational operator has no incentives in bidding a price lower than its marginal cost, i.e. p < MC. Indeed, by doing so, it would suffer the risk that p ≤ SMP < MC, thus entering the merit order and being obliged to produce. For the producer this would result in a net loss equal to MC -SMP.
On the other side, if the producer bade a price greater than its marginal cost, i.e. p > MC, then it would risk that MC < SMP < p, thus not being called to produce. This would result in a missed opportunity to take a net profit, i.e. once again in a net loss equal to SMP -MC.
The conclusion is that, under the above assumptions, the operator shall always bid a price equal to its marginal cost, i.e. p = MC.
Note that, if the assumption of the operator being a price taker is no longer valid, i.e. the operator has some degrees of market power, then it could take some actions in order to distort the market competition and the condition p = MC may not always hold.
